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Industrial relations changes in the Maldives: Critical events and actors
Ali Najeeb, Villa College, Maldives
Mary Barrett, School of Management, Operations and Marketing, University of
Wollongong
Abstract
This paper analyses recent changes in the industrial relations (IR) system in the
Maldives. Critical incidents were compiled from interview and document data and
analysed using a quasi-grounded theory approach. The analysis shows that,
precipitated by the political events of September 2003, profound democratic and IR
changes took place, including the emergence of new IR actors and institutions.
However, the outcomes of these profound changes were short-lived, reverting to old
undemocratic practices and arrangements. The paper highlights the reasons why
democratic change occurred as it did in the Maldives and why it reversed.

Introduction
The institutional perspective has shown how entities arise, acquire identities and interests, and
become actors in institutional contexts (Wood et al., 2014). Nevertheless, some aspects of the
institutional perspective and, within it, industrial relations (IR) are still developing. For example,
although institutional research emphasizes how actors engage in institutional change,
understanding of how those actors emerge is still developing (Hwang & Colyvas, 2011). Further,
until recently IR research has largely focused on advanced industrialised nations rather than
emerging economies (Kuruvilla and Erickson, 2002; Wood et al., 2014). Moreover, research
typically links IR outcomes to countries’ economic policies rather than to their path of political
development (Thelen, 2009). Addressing these gaps, this paper examines the link between
political change and IR developments in the Maldives, considering the following questions: (1)
what is the nature and cause of political and IR changes in the Maldives; (2) how did political
and IR changes occur; and (3) why did the changes occur as they did? To answer these questions,
this paper employs an historical institutional perspective to explore the role of actors in IR events
(Thelen, 1999).
The paper covers IR issues in a relatively under-researched context, the Maldives. The study
makes three contributions. First, it systematically uses an historical institutional perspective and
the literature on the Maldivian political economy to show how institutional and IR change in the
Maldives occurred, how new IR actors and institutions were established through political
modernization, and how IR gains made as result of political changes backtracked with the
reversal of democracy. It also provides a nuanced understanding of the fragility of democratic
changes, and provides a more rigorous explanation of the extent to which they caused the
February 2012 coup. Second, the study highlights the role of local and international actors at
various stages of the Maldivian democratic journey. Third, by using a quasi-grounded theory
approach to define and evaluate critical change incidents, the study provides a practical solution
to the problem of defining a time-span in which significant institutional change can be seen to
have taken place.
1

The paper is organized as follows. It first reviews the political and economic development of the
Maldives and discusses the role of institutional analysis in IR research. Then, after outlining the
study’s research method, it analyses political and IR change in the Maldives since 2003, showing
how specific actors influenced and/or emerged from the changes. The final section discusses
theoretical implications of the findings and suggests future research directions.

The political and economic development of the Maldives
The Republic of Maldives consists of about 1190 tiny, low-lying coral islands stretched across
the equator in the Indian Ocean, with an entire territorial size of 859,000 square kilometres. Only
192 islands are inhabited of which 101 have been developed as self-contained tourist resorts
(MTAC, 2015). The population of 310,000 belong to a common race, Maldivian; embrace the
same culture and religion, Islam; and speak a common language, Dhivehi (DNP, 2012).
From the 1880s to the mid-1960s, the Maldives was governed by monarchies (Rasheed, 2014).
The political state during this period was controlled by the monarchical rulers, their families and
elites. The monarchical rule was characterised by the political desires and personal interests of
the ruling class. The Maldives was a British protectorate until 1965. However, as the British
engagement with the Maldives was intended to ensure political security for the Maldives rather
than as a means to develop a mechanism of democratic governance, the Maldives did not inherit
a political or legal system from the superior British institutional systems (Rasheed, 2014). As a
result, the Maldivian legal system is a complex mixture of Shariah law and English civil and
common law (MoFA, 2010).
The Maldives became a republic in 1953 but the First Republic lasted only eight months before
reverting to a Sultanate. The Second Republic was established in 1968. Until 2008, the President
was elected by the Parliament and endorsed by the public in a referendum. Between 1968 and
2008 Maldivians experienced two presidencies. As the Maldives was under monarchical rule,
fundamental rights such as freedom of association and freedom of speech were suppressed under
both presidencies (BHRC, 2012). In addition, income and wealth distribution gaps widened,
nepotism and corruption were rife (Amnesty International, 2005; US Department of State, 2009),
and there was no separation of powers. An embryonic opposition movement emerged in the
1990s, but its voice and discussion of individual rights generally were silenced by government
control of the media (Shaheed and Upton, 2008). A personalised political system was created
which acted as a barrier for the government to establish democratic governance during the 1990s
(Rasheed, 2014). A democratization process began in the early 2000s, leading to the enactment
of a new Constitution and the first multi-party election in 2008. Parliamentary and local council
elections followed in 2009 and 2010 respectively (MoFA, 2010).
Although free market principles inherited from the period when the Maldives was a British
protectorate (Rasheed, 2014) and British trade dominated the region, trade and economic activity
did not develop until the 1970s. The Bora merchants who dominated trade in the Maldives until 1960s
also functioned in a weak institutional and business environment (Rasheed, 2014). As a result,
formal employment is a recent phenomenon in the Maldives. Until the early 1960s, economic
activity was paid in kind (HCRM, 2009), but this changed after two major tourist resorts were
developed (Najeeb, 2013), which spawned other industries including fishing and construction.
2

However family members and associates of the president controlled these economically
important sectors, exacerbating precarious forms of employment and the imbalance of wealth
and power between capital and labour (ICNC, 2012). While the Maldives today is a democracy
with an open, private sector-led economy, disparities in wealth and opportunity remain,
especially between the capital and outlying islands. Despite rapid economic growth from
tourism, job creation has not matched growth in the working age population (currently about
200,000). In September 2011 there were close to 100,000 expatriate employees in the Maldives
mostly in tourism and construction (Naish, 2012) and approximately 44,000 illegal workers
(Latheef, 2011). Unemployment among Maldivians in 2012 was 28% (DNP, 2012).

Institutional analysis in IR research
Institutional analysis in IR has traditionally focused on formal regulatory institutions such as
unions, laws and regulations (Jackson & Muellenborn, 2012). However, according to Wood and
Lane (2012) and Morgan and Hauptmeier (2014), the institutional literature now recognizes that
institutions are not as clearly coupled as often depicted, and that with national contexts it is likely
that not one but several dominant work and employment relations paradigms are likely to be
encountered. Wood et al. (2014) suggest that national institutional arrangements are constantly
developing in a non-linear manner, and can never be made to assume the precise form or
function as at the time of their original design. This reflects the choices of social actors who, in
enacting and contesting specific frameworks, seek to bend structures to suit specific needs, and,
in interpreting rules and procedures, invariably impart an element of subjectivity (Wilkinson &
Wood, 2012). The behaviour of these social actors is shaped by ‘institutional logics’, which
provide the ‘formal and informal rules of action, interaction, and interpretation that guide and
constrain decision makers’ (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999:904). In complex environments,
competing or contradictory institutional logics co-exist, creating ambiguity and hence
opportunities for actors to initiate change (Najeeb, 2013b). The change process may replace or
combine earlier logics resulting in hybrid ideas (Rupidara and McGraw, 2010: 616). Thus
institutional change concerns the erosion of an institutional logic which may change or
ultimately even disappear (Oliver, 1992).
Researchers following historical institutional analytical perspective place institutions and power
relations at the centre of any analysis of change (Thelen, 2009). Historical institutionalism links
the emergence of and changes in institutions and employment practices with wider developments
in society and the nation-state. Institution building and consolidation result from formative
events or crises with the result that ‘the longer the institutional arrangements remain in place, the
more likely they are to be overturned’ (Wilkinson & Wood, 2012:378). An exogenous event is
required for a radical change to be initiated (Wood & Lane, 2012).
Bronstein (1995:163) argues that as all IR systems bear the marks of their origins, any change to
individual, historical, political, legal, economic, ideological, social and cultural variables will
change how IR are conducted. Accordingly, studies of IR change have focused on these
variables. Kuruvilla and Erickson (2002:173) argue that “at any given moment some forces will
be more urgent than others” and, in particular, that external constraints on national institutions
such as pressure from transnational institutions predominate in driving actors to engage in
institutional change.
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IR scholars have also tried to analyse IR change in terms of whether it reflects evolutionary or
discontinuous change (punctuated equilibrium) (Bronstein, 1995; Erickson and Kuruvilla, 1998;
Wood et al., 2014). Evolutionary change is characterized by incremental changes which
accumulate over a long period (North, 1990). Punctuated equilibrium, in contrast, consists of
sharp shifts from one institutional arrangement to another (Streek, 2012). These patterns are
revolutionary because a prolonged period of equilibrium or evolution is interrupted by a crisis
that throws things into turmoil until a radical new set of institutional arrangements is established.
There are three main components of the punctuated equilibrium view of change: deep structure,
equilibrium periods, and revolutionary periods (Gersick, 1991). Transformational change to an
IR system occurs when there are changes to the components of IR deep structure, that is, to
definitions of property rights, the relative status of employees and employers, levels of
individualism vs. collectivism, the nature of exchange in the labour market, and to the
fundamental strategies of employers, unions, and governments.
Historical institutionalism not only explains change but also explains persistence, stability,
continuity and resilience. Institutional path dependency explains why institutions continue to
operate in their own particular way (North, 1990). It recognizes that some institutions are deeply
embedded, which makes any radical departure from established patterns of behaviour difficult.
Stakeholders invest so much in operating within the boundaries created by their institutions that
they do not want to follow any alternative pathway. For example, when institutions are
inherently undemocratic, they create undemocratic paths for present and future politics (Bell,
2011). As mentioned before, although such pre-existing weak institutional paths may change
over time (Thelen, 2009), the nature of such changes depends on the political interactions within
the existing institutional setting (Rasheed, 2014). This suggests that any traditionally transmitted
undemocratic political practices embedded in the political system may weaken the government’s
ability to establish progressive IR systems.

Research approach: Data collection and analysis
The research approach was primarily qualitative, using document searches and face-to-face
interviews. Thirty people directly involved in the events and practices being analysed were
chosen primarily through purposive and snowball sampling. The interviews used an open-ended
format with interviewees being invited to describe their experiences of recent economic, legal
and political changes in the Maldives. Interviews were conducted either in English or Dhivehi
and lasted between 20 and 75 minutes. Table 1 below indicates the number of participants from
specific groups, and the coding system by which the paper refers to each participant.
Table 1 here.
The data were analysed using a quasi-grounded approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Corbin and
Strauss, 2008) to identify “critical incidents (CIs)”. In Flanagan’s original (1954) description, a
CI is defined as any human activity sufficiently complete in itself to permit inferences and
predictions about the person performing it. This approach, however, is less suited to the
historical institutionalist paradigm used here, which seeks understanding of the long-term
significance of events and institutions rather than individuals. As Campbell (2004) explains, a
particular time-span of critical events can provide an appropriate timeframe for institutional
4

analysis, but significant events are difficult to define. An apparently critical event such as the
passing of a new law may have little long-term effect whereas an apparently small event may
have major consequences.
We did two things to overcome this problem. First, relying on Boselie’s (2009:97) definition of a
CI as “a definite and discrete occurrence that interrupts normal procedures or precipitates a
crisis”, we used a semi-structured rather than an unstructured interview format. Second,
interviewer knowledge based on the document analysis and previous interviews was introduced
to prompt further reflection. The second adaptation was derived from the quasi-grounded theory
approach used in the study. Documentary sources were first searched for key issues which
appeared critical in Boselie’s (2009) sense, that is, which a substantial number of participants or
documentary sources indicated had precipitated a crisis or, alternatively, marked the restitution
of equilibrium. They were coded accordingly. Events coded as marking the onset of a crisis or
the restitution of equilibrium yielded our timeframe: 2003-2009. These ‘crisis onset’ and ‘crisis
ending’ events were grouped with events occurring between the two which, again, participants
saw as producing a trajectory from crisis onset to crisis ending. This process generated a list of
events that could be plausibly shown to encompass all (and only) truly critical incidents. There
were 11 such critical incidents (see Table 2).
Table 2 here.

Findings
The 11 CIs were tentatively grouped into similar thematic categories according to the issues they
appeared to embody. The categories were then tested by first comparing CIs as they were
reported in the interviews and documentary sources, and then by comparing them with relevant
literature (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). This process yielded nine thematic
categories: the democratization process, democratization and labour rights, the development of
dispute resolution mechanisms, employment legislation and regulation, constitutional changes,
employee associations, employer associations, the role of government in IR, and international
actors. In the remainder of this section, we outline interviewee perceptions of each theme as it
emerged in the CIs and discuss it in terms of the literature on institutional and IR change.
The democratization process: From stringent control to democratic concessions On 19
September 2003 security guards tortured to death an inmate of the Maafushi Prison located in the
capital of the Maldives, Male’. Despite government efforts to cover up the matter, the death
became public knowledge through the inmate’s mother. When the news reached other inmates
they rioted. Security guards opened fire on them, killing three and seriously wounding 17 others
(BHRC, 2012). Although some condoned the security guards’ actions, people took to the streets
and began demanding institutional accountability and democratic freedoms. According to a
former Secretary-General of the HRCM, the severity of the event provided a focus for the
domestic opposition and the international community, enabling them to work together:
They [the opposition] suddenly found an event [which was] sort of drastic […] which was
totally unexpected, which garnered support in both the domestic and the international arena.
So it helped consolidate the efforts of the domestic opposition which was backed by the
international community. (HR28)
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Several opposition figures gave interviews to the international media exposing the government’s
human rights violations before going into exile in Sri Lanka. There they established the
Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) and sought international support. Under pressure from
within and abroad, in 2004 the government announced a “roadmap to reform” and convened the
Constitutional Assembly to amend the Constitution (Maldives Partnership Forum, 2006). A
presidential decree in 2005 gave political parties the right to operate in the Maldives (The
President’s Office, 2007). The MDP, which had been operating in the UK and Sri Lanka, was the
first to register. Four parties were registered by the end of 2005 (FIDH, 2012). Pressure from
transnational groups resulted in the government undertaking a dialogue – “Westminster talks
2006” – with the opposition. Eight political parties participated in the elections held in 2008.
The reaction of the domestic community to the Maafushi Prison death supports Kristensen and
Morgan’s (2012) argument that political upheavals allow individual actors to work collectively
to reformulate interests and roles. The ensuing events which culminated in the 2008 elections
suggest the initial event was sufficiently critical to alter institutional path trajectories (Thelen,
2009). The establishment of the MDP is an example of “purposeful and continual actions of
individuals and collective actors”, a condition crucial for institutional change (Reay et al.,
2006:993). A sociological model of how actors pursue their goals suggests they “pursue
legitimacy or taken-for-granted cognitive scripts” (Jackson & Muellenborn, 2012:475). The
government’s “road-map to reform” comprised eight key elements including “promoting and
strengthening human rights”, “enhancing the independence of the judiciary”, “a more
independent media”, and “modernization of the electoral system.” These elements along with the
Westminster talks in 2006, which will be discussed later, resonate with the scripts associated
with a pursuit of democratic legitimacy. Overall, the events triggered by the September 2003
death support the idea that institutions are political outcomes formed through conflicts and
compromises between actors, and that if conditions change then actors seek to change
institutions (Kristensen & Morgan, 2012).
Democratization and labour rights – Employment issues flow from the political agenda
Following the September 2003 events, employment issues emerged as a common theme in
activists’ demands. For instance, following the president’s call for public debate on constitutional
reform, reformists organized a series of forums (minivan bahus) to discuss political and human
rights issues. Six forums were held before key leaders were jailed following demonstrations in
August 2004 (Shafeeg, 2011). The HRCM also organized public forums in which a recurring
demand was for an independent civil service. The demand arose from the fear on the part of
politically active government employees that they would be dismissed. As a labour activist
recalled:
We wanted the assurance that we would not lose our jobs because we belonged to the
opposition. In one of the forums, I even first asked the chair whether I could speak
because I was a government employee. (LA22)

Besides these forums, protests were organized by the MDP in association with various workers
movements. For example, the MDP and port workers (majooreen) led the 2006 May Day rally.
Employment issues were also prominent in these protests. The HR manager of a local resort
recalled the scene as follows:
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I saw people holding large banners with slogans such as ‘enact employment and
pension laws’, ‘join the ILO’, ‘allow unions’, ‘set minimum wage’, ‘follow
international labour standards’, ‘abolish discrimination’, ‘equal pay for work of equal
value’ and so on. (RM16)

The media, which had become relatively free as a by-product of political change, played a key
role in advocating employment rights. The opposition movement started a radio station
[Minivan radio] which broadcast from the UK. At the same time, the local print media began
focusing on employment rights issues. As another labour activist commented:
We started seeing articles in newspapers about labour issues for the first time in 20042005. We saw bold headings such as ‘labour rights must be protected by law’. It was
unprecedented. We hadn’t seen such a thing before, despite the print media such as
Haveeru Daily being there since 1979. (LA23)

Through forums, protests, and news media, employees became aware of previously obscure
entitlements. For instance, employees became aware that under the blue (1997) Constitution they
were entitled to a pension. As a MTAC official noted:
The right to have the pension was even guaranteed in our ‘blue Constitution’. But
nobody spoke of this before. The opposition blamed the government for not taking
action to provide a constitutional right and started to speak about this. (GO25)

In a similar way, employers and employees became aware of a 1994 employment regulation
governing employment relations in the private and public sectors, and they started enquiring
about it. As a former director of the Labour Relations Authority (LRA) explained:
I was at that time working in the legal department of the employment ministry and we
received calls from people – both managers and ordinary employees – enquiring about
the labour regulation. They requested to put it up on the website, asked whether the
ministry could provide an English version of it and so on. (GO24)

Increased awareness of employment rights led to employees pushing for them both collectively
through petitions and strikes, and individually. An example of individual action was a case filed
by a government employee who had been dismissed for political reasons. Although such
dismissals had been common, no-one had previously challenged them administratively or legally.
The judgement favoured the employee. A former director of LRA commented about the
government’s reaction to this landmark decision:
The government took the matter very seriously and responded swiftly. They wanted to
challenge the decision in the High Court. We advised not to do so. But the government
still tried to figure out how to avoid such a decision in the future. (GO24)

Bronstein (1995) and Anner (2008), examining IR changes in Latin America between the late
1970s and the mid-1990s, found that the democratization process with its increased freedom of
assembly and expression brought hope that employment rights would eventually be granted.
Rupidara and McGraw (2010) made a similar finding for Indonesia. These events in the
Maldives illustrate how, as in these countries, political dynamics prompted IR developments, and
changes to institutional mechanisms encouraged actors to alter institutions (Barley and Tolbert,
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1997). They also indicate the media’s role in disseminating and legitimating ideas (Braam et al.,
2007) and increasing pressure on institutions (Daniels et al., 2002).
Employment dispute resolution mechanisms - from handmaidens of government to guardians
of employment rights As in Latin America, strikes in the Maldives began with political change.
The first strike was organized by employees in an international five-star resort (Robinson, 2010).
Workers demanded improvements in working conditions and an end to long-standing
employment practices favouring expatriates over local workers. Many strikes by resort workers in
the period 2005-2008 ended with key employees being sacked (HRCM, 2009). Nevertheless,
improvements in line with workers’ demands often followed later. As a resort worker said:
We went on strike because we wanted things to be improved for us and to eliminate all
sorts of discrimination. We demanded better food and better facilities. The
management didn’t agree with us. But later on, a local chef was employed and we were
given gym facilities. (RW10)

Seeking legitimacy in the eyes of potential foreign investors (Jackson & Muellenborn, 2012), the
government responded quickly and severely to put down the strikes. The introduction of
Employment Dispute Resolution Regulation (2011) further limited the constitutional right to
strike by imposing numerous conditions on its legality. Similarly, the Employment Tribunal’s
function was ostensibly to resolve employment disputes, but the Act which established it did not
mention stoppages or strikes. Similarly, the 2013 Peaceful Assembly Act restricted
demonstrations to locations designated by the government, so that it served as a means of
political control rather than to enable peaceful assembly (Najeeb, 2014). These actions show how
a powerful actor such as the state can establish and support parallel logics in the regulatory
environment
Nevertheless, such conflicting institutional frameworks create loopholes which actors can exploit
later and this happened in the Maldives. For example, in response to domestic and international
pressure over the events of September 2003, the first human rights commission was established
in 2003 by presidential decree (Shafeeg, 2011). However, as its members were handpicked by
the president, political and human rights activists pushed for an independent body. As a labour
activist noted:
We demanded individual rights to be recognized as equally with state’s rights and called
for an independent human rights oversight body. (LA22)

In response in 2006 the government passed the Human Rights Act and established an
independent Human Rights Commission (US Department of State, 2009). A former SecretaryGeneral of the commission recalled his involvement in some of the HRC’s activities as follows:
We conducted a number of rapid assessments and investigations into the abuse of
workers and also visited places where migrants were working. We observed a number of
abhorrent things […]. We had a number of meetings with the LRA and published reports
and made direct recommendations to these state agencies. (HR28)

Despite the formation of the Employment Tribunal and the LRA, employment-related cases still
comprise the vast majority of cases dealt with by the HRCM, with 99 employment related
complaints dealt with in 2014 (HRCM, 2015). This finding supports the finding by Heery and
8

Frege (2006) that actors who perform IR functions in the absence of traditional IR actors often
continue in this role even after more prominent IR actors and systems are established.
Employment legislation and regulations – from fragmentation to protective unity Since the
1960s, the government had used various procedural regulations to administer the employment of
government employees (HRCM, 2009). These fragmented regulations were consolidated into a
single regulation only in 1994. The new regulation, which extended to both private and public
sector employees, covered minimum standards in employment agreements, hiring and firing,
promotion, compensation and benefits, working hours, and leave entitlements (The President’s
Office, 2007) However it lacked critical provisions on discrimination and unfair dismissal
(HRCM, 2009). Moreover, few stakeholders were aware of its existence as information about it
was not available in the public domain and not disseminated to private sector
stakeholders. Accordingly, as a resort manager (RM19) pointed out, “… this regulation was not
implemented in the private sector.”
An independent civil service was established via the Civil Service Act (2007) as part of the
president’s “road map to reform”. It comprehensively covers the governance of civil service
employment. In May 2008, as the democratization movement began, the Maldivian Parliament
passed the Employment Act 2008, the first general law governing employment relations. Its
objectives were: (1) to protect vulnerable workers’ employment rights; (2) to regulate and
improve the welfare of both local and expatriate workers; and (3) to pave the way for the
Maldives to join the ILO and ratify its core conventions (Employment Act, 2008). It imposed
severe penalties for violations of its provisions on forced labour, unfair workplace
discrimination, and the employment of minors. It also regulated a range of individual
employment matters, the employment of foreign workers, and employment agency
activities. Finally, it provided for the establishment of an Employment Tribunal to adjudicate
employment disputes. The Tribunal became fully functional in April 2009. The Act also
authorized the LRA to improve the law’s application by identifying legal loopholes. As the
legislation applies to all employment sectors except the security forces, it has become the main
avenue for introducing IR changes. Thus Maldivian employment law exemplifies “changes
which reinforce or establish protections for workers by stipulating these in legislation” (Cook,
1998:317)
Constitutional changes – solidifying the legal basis of employment rights The Maldives
ushered in a new liberal Constitution (‘fehi qaanoon asaasee’ – the Green Constitution) on
7 August2008 when Parliament amended the 1997 Constitution (‘noo qaanoonu assaasee’ – the
Blue Constitution1). The new Constitution ensured the separation of the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of the state and established new independent institutions and laws. It also
extended some existing rights, reflecting the trend towards democratization, and strengthened
independent bodies such as the HRCM and the CSC (FIDH, 2012). The 2008 Constitution
granted a range of employment rights including the right to work, to organize trade unions, to
strike, and the right of pension, and prohibited forced labour and all forms of unfair
discrimination. As an HR manager of a resort noted: Constitutional rights have changed our way
of life (RM17). Following the enactment of the new Constitution, the Parliament passed the
Pension Act, which required all public and private employers and employees to participate in the
1

The names of the constitutions were informally referred to by the colour of their covers, hence the ‘Blue
Constitution’ and the ‘Green Constitution’.
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Maldives Retirement Pension Scheme with a minimum monthly contribution of 7% of the
pensionable wage. These constitutional rights prompted further positive developments in
Maldivian IR context. Accordingly they support Fry’s (2008) argument, based on his
observations of Laos, that constitutional reforms strengthen labour rights.
Employee associations – from independent movements to quasi political parties Under the
Association Act clubs and associations in the Maldives must be registered with the Registrar of
Associations at the Ministry of Home Affairs. More than 700 associations and NGOs were
registered between 2003 and 2008 (Raajje Foundation, 2009). However, before 2005, the
government did not allow opposition associations to register (Shafeeg, 2011). Until 2005, when
the Teachers Association of Maldives (TAM) and the Maldivian Medical Association (MMA)
were allowed to register, the Law Society of Maldives was the only employee association
formally in existence. The TAM and the MMA represented the interests of many government
employees and, once they were registered, they energetically lobbied for salary increases for
their employees until the Maldives Civil Servants Association (MCSA) was formed in 2009
following the establishment of an independent civil service.
The Tourism Employee Association of the Maldives (TEAM) is the most active employee
association. It was formed in 2008 by resort workers seeking protection of their employment
rights because they had been excluded from Chapter 4 of the Employment Act when it was
initially enacted. Najeeb (2014) attributes this exclusion to the fact that many members of
parliament were also resort owners. A TEAM executive recalled the association’s beginnings as
follows:
We collected 10,000 signatures from resort workers and submitted a petition to both the
government and the parliament giving them an ultimatum to amend the law. We told
them if they do not meet our demands, we would bring the industry to a standstill.
(TM29)

Since its formation, the TEAM has continued to build its membership and act for workers in
workplaces and the courts. Minivan News (2010) quoted TEAM’s president:
We have 100 cases ongoing in courts ranging from the labour tribunal to the Supreme
Court. I am spending $2000 a month on the TEAM and working 20 hours a day,
because resort workers are not paid enough to save up for things like lawyers.

Despite their achievements and their potential to emerge as unions, employee associations risk
becoming trapped in party politics. While acknowledging the importance of political
independence, employee associations also believe political affiliation is necessary to provide a
voice for employees. As a TEAM executive noted:
Resorts are conforming to the Employment Act not because they really want to, but
because they fear that our man [the president of TEAM – an MP] in the parliament
might play the name and shame game if they don’t follow the law. (TM30)

The interactions among the TEAM, the government and members of parliament reflect the
choices of actors who ‘seek to bend structures to suit specific needs’ (Wilkinson and Wood,
2012:378). As Bhattacherjee and Ackers (2010) observe about India, one reason politicians link
themselves with employee associations is that they can access large numbers of supporters who
10

need skilled representation of their interests. The establishment of the TEAM also exemplifies
how the political environment interacts with institutional arrangements such as the constitution
and ensuing employment legislation to facilitate the rise of labour movements (Tilly, 1995). It
also shows how new IR actors emerge in the absence of traditional actors such as trade unions
(Michelson et al., 2009).
Employer associations – continuing to serve the elite In the 1980s when the Maldives
Association for the Tourism Industry (MATI) was established, it was the only official employer
association. Formed by close associates of the regime who controlled tourism, the MATI helped
shape government policy on tourism. Later, during the democratization process, other employer
associations such the Maldives Association for the Construction Industry (MACI) emerged.
Consistent with Cooke’s (2011) findings for PRC, employer associations in the Maldives put
pressure on the government if legislation promised to have a negative impact on their businesses.
For example, they successfully lobbied to prevent expatriate employees from enrolling in
employee retirement schemes and for more favourable goods and services tax legislation.
However employer associations do not engage in collective bargaining and most still do not have
a significant role in developing policies for their member organisations.
Economic and labour market policy change - towards ‘Aneh Dhivehi Raaje’ (A different
Maldives) A new MDP-led government came to power in the multi-party elections in November
2008, ending Maumoon Abdul Qayyoom’s 30-year dictatorship. The MDP had campaigned with
an ambitious manifesto: ‘Aneh Dhivehi Raaje’ (A different Maldives). The MDP’s first task in
government was to stabilise the economy by increasing taxes and cutting the public service.
Since then it has generally pursued a centre-right economic policy of privatization, public service
cuts, and seeking foreign investment (The President’s Office, 2009). This agenda has been costly
for employees and has further polarized Maldivian society (Nazeer, 2010).
The Maldivian government has included a labour ministry since the 1990s. At first, its function
was to issue expatriate work permits, deal with unpaid wages and foreign worker repatriation
(Najeeb, 2014). Under the MDP government, responsibility for labour administration, labour
inspection, formulating employment policies, and employment promotion was vested in the
Ministry for Youth and Sport (MHRYS). While the LRA performs labour administration and
inspection functions, the MHRYS has improved training levels through university and vocational
education scholarships (Shifleen, 2011). Education and training have also been extended with the
establishment of the Maldives National University and the Maldives Polytechnic. MHRYS job
centres helped match employees with employers in a tight labour market (Maldives Resort
Workers, 2009). The government also introduced a social welfare system to protect vulnerable
workers.
The IR policy changes discussed in this section show how substantial political shifts are reflected
in how the economy in general and IR systems in particular function in a particular society
(Thelen, 2009). It also supports the findings of Kuruvilla and Venkataratnam (1996) that in
economically successful Asian countries, industrial relations policies and institutions are closely
tied to economic development strategies. In particular, adopting IR policies to enhance
workplace flexibility and skills enhancement is consistent with moves towards democratization.
In the Maldives, however, some progressive MDP policies in education and welfare have been
accompanied by some degree of labour repression.
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International actors – keeping the government under close scrutiny Maldivian IR systems have
been influenced by changes in the social and political environment and by ideas transferred
across national and institutional boundaries. For instance, the ILO’s technical assistance was
sought to draft employment legislation. The 2008 government expedited the Maldives’
admission to the ILO, which was completed in May 2009. The Parliament approved ILO core
conventions and the government ratified them in January 2012 (MoFA, 2013), but they are yet to
be translated into the Maldivian regulatory environment. A former director of the LRA described
the ILO’s engagement with the Maldives this way:
The ILO started visiting the Maldives and reviewing institutional and legal provisions
and advising the government on how to accede to conventions. That helped develop the
government’s general awareness of their obligations in terms of establishing strong
industrial relations. (GO24)

Other international actors contributed to political change in the Maldives. For instance, Amnesty
International published reports on the repressive nature of the Maldivian regime. The UK-based
Friends of Maldives developed the pro-democracy movement’s independent media capacity and
exposed human rights violations. The Commonwealth and the UN provided legal
and Shariah experts to help draft the new Constitution (Shafeeg, 2011). The UK High
Commissioner to the Maldives organized educational forums about democracy and held
Westminster talks in Sri Lanka to expedite constitutional reforms (Maldives PartnershipForum,
2006). The UK Conservative Party provided technical support to the MDP to develop its
institutional capacity.
New institutions and practices emerged from these interventions, reflecting internationally
recognized structures and practices. For instance, the MDP was established on a centre-right
platform and the Employment Tribunal was formed as a quasi-judicial and quasi-administrative
body. A high degree of pressure is also apparent in the way some international organizations and
foreign governments sought to persuade the Maldivian government to comply with international
human rights and democratic standards. For instance, after the August 2004 crackdown on
opposition protesters, the government declared a state of emergency. The European Union
responded by demanding the Maldives government implement democratic reforms or face a
variety of boycotts (Shafeeg, 2011).
The nature and causes of the ‘coup d’état’ Although the changes described above appear
revolutionary, recent events show the difficulty of sustaining truly radical shifts and these
changes have not become fully institutionalized (Rupidara & McGraw, 2010). On 7 February
2012 after three years in power, the MDP government was ousted by what the party described as
a ‘coup d’état’ (Robinson, 2012) executed by some mutinous law enforcement agencies and
political parties. A number of factors could underlie the overthrow of the MDP government and
the failure to sustain the political, institutional and IR establishment. First, although 80 percent of
coups in the world between 1950 and 2008 took place in countries where autocratic regimes
were replaced with more democratic ones, this was not the case in the Maldives with the
February 2012 coup (Lutfi, 2015). The Maldivian coup replaced the first democratically elected
government with key figures who served the previous dictatorial regime which had governed the
country for the 30 years prior to 2008. Hence, this coup was undertaken not in the best interests
12

of Maldivians but to pursue the vested interests of certain elite groups. Governing Maldivians is
perceived to be easy and being in the government is seen as a lucrative business (Lutfi, 2015).
Second, historical and founding conditions embedded in political institutions weakened the
political and IR arrangements (Bell, 2011; Lutfi, 2015). Godard (2009) argues that historical
conditions and traditions become embedded in institutional norms that shape national
institutional environments and trajectories. In the case of the Maldives, traditionally there had
been competition between various political elites for political and vested interests. This
behaviour had been embedded in the political culture of the Maldives for over 800 years. With
the help of a group of political players several governments have been overthrown using havaru
– a militant group of people from six main regions of the capital (Lutfi, 2015; Rasheed, 2014).
Third, despite the MDP government’s best efforts to change the mechanisms of government,
traditionally weak informal rules, institutions and undemocratic practices created and shaped by
previous monarchical rule were transmitted over time to become embedded in the political
system. This reduced the MDP government’s capacity to manage socio-political and economic
activities in the most democratic manner (Rasheed, 2014). The weak political system did not
support efficient interactions between the government and society. There was an apparent lack of
adaptive efficiency in maintaining democracy. For instance, sometimes the government failed to
govern socio-political activities according to legislative and constitutional provisions (Rasheed,
2014).
Fourth, when the MDP government assumed office the local and global economies were in bad
shape. Consequently it took austerity measures which did not go down well with the public.
Moreover, the government introduced privatization through a private-public-partnership program
(PPPP), and introduced a progressive tax system and a welfare system which hurt the ego of
business elites who mobilized their resources against the MDP government (Lutfi, 2015).
Fifth, the 2008 elections only changed the executive of the state. All other machineries of the
state, including the newly formed judiciary, legislature, security forces and independent
institutions remained under the control of the former dictator. Consequently, most of the state
machinery worked against the government. As President Nasheed stated: “it is easy to change a
dictatorship but it is hard to get rid of the reminiscence of dictatorship” (Nasheed, 2013).
Finally, the pace of change was so fast it could not allow for careful planning of the execution of
the projects and programs. On the one hand, the fast pace of change appears positive as the
delivery of pledges started to emerge; on the other hand, the fast pace of change compromised
some democratic values and principles such as rigorous public consultation, transparency, and
following due process (Lutfi, 2015).
According to the historical institutional perspective, certain actors may become more powerful
than others at specific times, leading to a systemic crisis (Wood et al., 2014). In the case of the
Maldives, when the MDP was in power, various opposition forces at play were more powerful
than the government. The media was largely controlled by these forces and religious groups used
nationalistic and religious rhetoric against the government. These forces played a critical role in
bringing about the February 2012 coup. Some civil society organisations and employee
associations which strove to bring about democracy along with the MDP withdrew their support
and joined the opposition forces as their interests were not being served by the government’s
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policies. Although the MDP government tried to compromise with the opposition forces that
dominated the political and social arena to make compromises, its attempts were unsuccessful as
opposition forces were committed to overthrowing the government (Streek, 2012).
Beyond the ‘coup d’état’- reversal of democracy and IR gains Wood and Lane (2012) argue
that if the change process is only partially destructive, there is a possibility that past institutional
arrangements will be reconstructed with result that might differ from the preceding regime. This
effect is apparent in the case of the aftermath of the coup. The trend has been towards a complete
reversal of political and IR gains made during the MDP government. Since the change of the
government in 2012, constitutional rights have been threatened and some positive developments
in civil and employment rights have been reversed (Rodgers, 2014). The right to elect a
government of choice has been undermined by the alleged undue influence of the Supreme Court
and security forces. One result is that the half-brother of the former dictator won the 2013
general and subsequent parliamentary elections. Restrictions in freedom of speech have led the
country to fall from 52nd position in the 2010 Press Freedom Index to108 in 2014 (Reporters
without Borders, 2014). As the government is in control of the legislature and judiciary,
democratic institutions have become dysfunctional. The rules of the constitution lack check and
balance mechanisms (Rasheed, 2014). Hence, in the absence of functioning democratic
institutions, the current government is manipulating legislation and is imposing hierarchical
authority over political and economic activities to achieve self-interested goals. For example,
several opposition leaders were recently jailed on terrorism charges.
The reversal of democracy has been having a significant impact on IR. For example, in January
2013, the government ratified the Peaceful Assembly Act which prohibits all forms of protest or
assembly in a tourist resort. Cases of dismissal of private and public sector employees for
political activism have also been reported (Naaif, 2013; Zaheena, 2012). For instance, more than
10 employees of a public limited company were fired for attending 2015 May Day rally
organised by opposition parties (Zaheena, 2015). Public sector employees have been forced to
attend the ruling party’s political functions. The independence of the Civil Service has also been
threatened as employees have been dismissed as a result of undue influence from politicians.
Hence, the job security of public sector employees is at all-time low.
The current government’s commitment to IR developments is also in question as although the
ILO core convention has been ratified, the relevant legal framework has not been established.
Similarly, TEAM executives reported that despite their demands, the government is playing
delaying tactics to avoid sending the ILO drafted IR bill to the government controlled
parliament. Similarly, rather than adopting a holistic approach to initiate employment law
reform, the government is arbitrarily amending the law to serve its political interests.
Due to the erosion of democratic rights, there has been a replication of events similar to those
that took place in 2003-2012 to establish democracy. The role of local and international actors
has been crucial in this endeavour. While ILO is continuing its engagement with the Maldivian
government to develop IR systems, other international actors such as Amnesty International and
the European Union have been putting pressure in a similar manner as they did previously to
improve the human rights situation. Most friendly nations have also been engaging with the
Maldivian government to make positive gains, although the government continues to influence
them through geopolitical games (Wood et al., 2014). The government has also been countering
these pressures by hiring international PR firms such as Omnia Strategy (Minivan News, 2015).
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Although international actors are making impactful gains in this process, local civil society
seems to be lagging behind in the effort to restore democracy. Most NGOs disintegrated when
the government that had backed them disintegrated and they have yet to reorganise and become
active to create effective change.

Discussion, implications and future research
This paper presents an historical institutional evaluation of political and IR developments in the
Maldives between 2003 and 2015. It highlights the ways in which a particular set of institutional
arrangements may be destabilized and replaced by new arrangements through the process of
political conflicts (Godard, 2009). The analysis reveals that economic development and
increased formal employment from the early 1970s to the early 2000s were not linked to more
progressive employment relations. However, consistent with North (1990), the prolonged
stability of the previous institutional arrangements was interrupted by a major political crisis in
September 2003, leading to new institutional arrangements. This supports Thelen’s (1999:36)
argument that “change in one institutional arena can reverberate, provoking changes in other
complementary institutions”. It is also consistent with research into IR developments in Latin
America (Anner, 2008; Bronstein, 1995) linking IR change to democratization.
The political changes brought new political, legal and IR institutions and actors into Maldivian
systems, including political parties, NGOs, independent institutions, employee associations, a
new Constitution, and new employment laws and regulations. The government’s labour and
education and training policies improved and new IR actors such as job centres emerged. As
Rupidara and McGraw (2010) observed about Indonesia, the ideas for the new institutions were
in part sourced from outside-in, providing alternative logics to the existing institutional
arrangements in the Maldives. As evidenced by the increased number of employee strikes, the
establishment of new IR institutions also changed the balance of power in the workplace.
Democratic changes in the Maldives took place as a result of an open struggle over the very core
of the institutional status quo – the system of governance. Local and international actors and the
media all created awareness about rights, pressured the government to make political and IR
changes, and facilitated the development of new institutions and laws, reflecting strong
normative influence(Scott, 2008). New employment actors such as political parties, NGOs,
employee associations, and agencies such as the HRCM represented employees in the absence of
traditional employment actors such as trade unions and sometimes continued their IR role after
trade unions were established.
The changes that took place between 2008 and 2012, such as freedom of expression and
association, the employment rights granted by the Constitution and accompanying legislation,
and the establishment of institutions such as the LRA and a quasi-administrative and quasijudicial employment tribunal, democratic reform and the 2008 Constitution suggest a complete
break with the past. Nevertheless some of the democratic changes have not been fully
institutionalized. In February 2012 the first democratically elected government of the Maldives
was allegedly ousted by a coup. Since then, there has been a reversal of civil and political rights.
It is significant that it has been so easy for the post-coup government to revert to the policies and
practices of the past. The study identified a number of reasons for the ousting of the progressive
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government and the reversal of democratic and employment rights. The main reason is that the
weak institutions, undemocratic rules, and monarchical practices embedded in the political
system have persisted in the current political system constraining the government’s capacity to
act in the most democratic and efficient manner (Godard, 2012; Rasheed, 2014). In short, the
pre-existing undemocratic rules in the Maldives inhibit the democratic reforms observed in
Western societies (Bell, 2015).
A number of insights can be drawn from the analysis. First, the Maldivian experience highlights
that institutional frameworks were built through the concerted efforts of social actors. This
suggests that understanding the relationship between social actors and institutions is required to
understand institutional change. Second, improvement in employment conditions in the Maldives
resulted from institutional rather than economic change, suggesting that at least some political
transformation is needed if employment rights are to be improved. Third, the change of the
progressive government in 2012 and reversal of democracy and IR gains back to the old order of
1968 to 2008 suggest that just as in Latin America, there is no guarantee that civil, political and
labour rights have been irrevocably secured (Anner, 2008; Bronstein, 1995). Future research
should examine the changes in a longer time frame to determine whether they have indeed
delivered a more equal power balance between labour and capital.
The critical incident approach used here has proved useful for defining a time-span of critical
events and evaluating their significance. It could also help determine whether the February 2012
coup, the subsequent presidential elections, or some other event presents the kind of watershed in
Maldivian politics and IR that the death of an inmate of the Maafushi island prison proved to be.
Future research could also investigate which new international standards and practices sourced
from the outside-in through normative means have been embedded in Maldivian institutions and
systems. This will help determine whether and how political and economic logics in the
Maldives have changed, and how its fledgling IR system is likely to develop.
Finally, while the present research identified specific political and economic factors influencing
change in one country, the Maldives, future research should employ a comparative focus to
illuminate whether similar patterns exist in other countries (Björkman et al., 2007). It is an
intriguing question why it is so much easier to oust progressive governments in some countries
than others, and how unions and other popular movements are prevented from limiting such
change. Democratic change in the Maldives and its reversal have parallels with the events of the
Arab Springs (Köhler & Bonnerjee, 2012). Accordingly, the concepts and research approach of
this paper could be helpful in analysing political and IR change in the Arab world.
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